Registrar Dean Logan said those improperly filled out ballots are impossible to count by hand because of the county's complicated voting system, which requires crossover voters to fill in two "bubbles": one to choose a political party and one to indicate their presidential choice.

"There's no way in looking at the ballot to discern voters' intent," Logan said after releasing preliminary findings about the flawed voting system.

First, the "universe of ballots impacted by the cross-over issue" while smaller than some media reports, is nonetheless staggering: 49,500 voters will, unless additional action is immediately taken, have their votes discarded. Twenty-six percent of all DTS voters in Los Angeles County are estimated to have cast ballots that will not count. In some districts, that rate climbs to 41% (in the 46th Congressional District); 45% (in the 27th Congressional District); and 56% (in the 37th Congressional District). We remind the Board that requiring DTS voters to take additional steps to cast their ballots - such as filling in a party selection bubble -- is neither required, nor permitted, by law.

Second, we strongly disagree that the "limitations of our voting system and the ballot design impede an ability to determine voter intent on those ballots that were impacted . . . ." The report states that "there is no way to definitively rule out the distinct possibility that a non-partisan voter used, for example, a Republican Party or minor party vote recorder and marked their ballot for one of those party candidates."

If this were true, all ballots cast at the polls would be suspect unless poll workers personally escorted each voter to the correct voting booth and ensured that a correct ballot was cast. Thus, for example, if a registered Green Party voter inadvertently cast a ballot in the Republican Party voting booth, the Inka-Vote system would record that voter's ballot for the corresponding Green Party candidate. The mere possibility that such a voter might cast a Republican ballot should not cause those ballots to be thrown out. Moreover, we find the likelihood of this "distinct possibility" extremely remote. Ultimately, when a DTS voter cast his or her ballot for a candidate in positions 11-15 - ballot positions for which DTS voters were only authorized to vote for Democratic candidates - it is contrary to the State Constitution and to the state Elections Code to disregard that vote.

In response to the Florida electoral fiasco in 2000, California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 43 on March 5, 2002. Proposition 43 inserted one simple line into Article II of the California Constitution: A voter who casts a vote in an election in accordance with the laws of this State shall have that vote counted. (Emphasis added.) Further, state law clearly states that when reviewing votes and voting systems, Election Code requirements "shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all of the provisions of the law." (See Cal. Elec. Code Sec. 19001.)

1. The Registrar must take all necessary steps to identify the precise number of DTS voters that were adversely affected by the ballot design flaw and identify the candidates for whom these DTS voters cast a ballot or, alternatively, the range of candidates for whom these voters may have cast a ballot.



2. The Registrar must ascertain voter intent, in a manner consistent with the Elections Code and the State Constitution.



3. The Registrar must count the votes of all DTS voters who cast a ballot for a presidential candidate, but did not mark the party selection, where voter intent is clear.



4. The Registrar must, as identified in his preliminary report, take all necessary steps to ensure that the DTS ballot design flaw is remedied for the June 3, 2008 State Primary Election.